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INTRODUCTION 
n August 2011, Mark Emmert, the president of the National 
Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA),1 convened a retreat of 
fifty college and university presidents of NCAA Division I member 
institutions.2 The ostensible goal of the meeting was to examine what 
President Emmert characterized as the erosion of the public’s trust in 
intercollegiate athletics.3 The presidents concluded that a series of 
issues threatened to undermine the four values on which the collegiate 
model of intercollegiate athletics is premised: (1) the primacy of 
student-athletes’ academic and athletic success; (2) intercollegiate 
athletics as a reflection of the values of higher education and the 
values of shared responsibility and accountability; (3) amateurism as 
the principle that guides the relationship between student-athletes and 
their institutions; and (4) intercollegiate competition must be guided 
by the principle of fair opportunity to compete.4 The perceived threats 
to the collegiate vision of intercollegiate athletics include: “[a] risk-
reward analysis of the intentional violation of national policy that fails 
to deter violations and that often is based on financial pressure,”5 
institutions and individuals prioritizing winning over integrity, and 
public and member institution distrust of both the NCAA’s ability to 
police itself and of the process by which the NCAA investigates and 
 
1 A voluntary association, the NCAA is comprised primarily of approximately 1200 
private and public colleges and universities. See About NCAA Membership, NCAA.ORG, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). The 
colleges and universities are organized in three membership classifications, Divisions I, II, 
and III. This Article focuses on the Division I enforcement process. 
2 NCAA WORKING GROUP ON COLLEGIATE MODEL—ENFORCEMENT, FINAL REPORT 
2 (2012) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT REPORT], available at http://www.nacwaa.org/sites 
/default/files/images/NCAA%20Final_Report_Oct%202012.pdf. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1. 
I
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adjudicates rules violations and imposes penalties for such 
violations.6 
This Article explores the NCAA enforcement structure, one of five 
areas of concern that the presidents and chancellors at the retreat 
believed could, if left unaddressed, significantly denigrate the 
collegiate model of intercollegiate athletics.7 In particular, the Article 
examines recommendations of the Working Group on Collegiate 
Model—Enforcement (hereinafter the Enforcement Working Group), 
which led to legislation that substantially revamps the NCAA 
enforcement structure. The Enforcement Working Group is one of 
five working groups established by the NCAA Division I Board of 
Directors8 following the August 2011 presidential retreat. The 
working groups were charged with evaluating threats to the collegiate 
model of intercollegiate athletics9 and promulgating legislation to 
address them.10 
The specific charge of the Enforcement Working Group was to 
promulgate NCAA legislation intended to (1) develop a multilevel 
violation structure; (2) expedite the processing of infractions cases; 
(3) enhance the NCAA’s penalty structure for violations of its 
regulations; and (4) reinforce the sense of shared responsibility for 
rules compliance among the constituent individuals and entities 
involved in intercollegiate athletics.11 The presidents further 
 
6 Id. at 2; see generally Timothy Davis & Christopher T. Hairston, NCAA Deregulation 
and Reform: A Radical Shift of Governance Philosophy?, 92 OR. L. REV. 77 (2013) 
(discussing other areas of concerns). 
7 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2–3. The four other concerns identified by 
the presidents are: the standard for measuring student-athlete academic success, “the 
allocation of financial resources within intercollegiate rules,” student-athletes’ financial 
well-being, and the process for promulgating NCAA rules and the expectation of shared 
responsibility for compliance. Id. For a detailed discussion of these areas of concern, see 
generally Davis & Hairston, supra note 6. 
8 The NCAA Division I Board is an eighteen-member body comprised of college 
presidents, athletic conference commissioners, and athletic directors. NCAA, 2013–14 
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 4.2.1 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf. The Board’s 
responsibilities include establishing and directing general policy, establishing strategic 
plans and adopting and defeating legislation, and “[r]eview[ing] and approv[ing] policies 
and procedures governing the enforcement program.” Id. § 4.2.2. 
9 See supra text accompanying notes 4–6. 
10 Davis & Hairston, supra note 6, at 79. The working groups are the: Enforcement 
Working Group, Rules Working Group, Student-Athlete Well-Being Working Group, 
Resource Allocation Working Group, and Division I Committee on Academic 
Performance. Id. 
11 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. 
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instructed the Enforcement Working Group to fulfill its charge while 
cognizant of the NCAA’s four core principles.12 Working within the 
framework of these directives, the Enforcement Working Group 
developed recommendations for a new enforcement structure that 
seeks to foster the following principles: (1) fairness to all participants 
involved in the enforcement process, including institutions that 
comply with NCAA regulations; (2) holding those responsible for 
rules violations (i.e., institutions, coaches, administrators, and 
student-athletes) accountable for their conduct at individual and 
institutional levels; (3) an appreciation for the notion of shared 
responsibility; and (4) enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
an infractions process that produces easily comprehensible, 
legitimate, and transparent results.13 
It was within the context of the forgoing concerns and guiding 
principles that the Enforcement Working Group recommended 
changes to the NCAA’s enforcement structure, including the 
processes by which alleged infractions are evaluated and adjudicated 
and how penalties for rules infractions are categorized.14 The 
Enforcement Working Group’s recommendations are reflected in 
NCAA legislation, approved by the NCAA Board of Directors, 
effective as of August 1, 2013.15 The Board’s approval of 
enforcement-related reforms comprise one component of the NCAA’s 
effort to deregulate its bylaws, which began in 2011.16 NCAA 
deregulation seeks to simplify NCAA rules and regulations so that 
they focus on NCAA core principles. Deregulation efforts also aim to 
establish a governance philosophy that emphasizes fairness of 
competition rather than competitive equity.17 
 
12 Id. at 3–4 (identifying the core principles). 
13 Id. at 4–6. 
14 Id. at 4–5. 
15 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.01.1; Gary Brown, Board Adopts Tougher, 
More Efficient Enforcement Program, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org 
/about/resources/media-center/news/board-adopts-tougher-more-efficient-enforcement      
-program. 
16 Associated Press, NCAA Approves Tougher Sanctions, ESPN.COM (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/8572310/ncaa-approves-tougher-sanctions      
-rule-breakers. 
17 Davis & Hairston, supra note 6, at 84. A competitive equity model attempts to place 
all athletic programs on an equal footing. Id. A fairness-of-competition model recognizes 
the diversity of institutions that compete at the Division I level. Under this model, schools 
will not be penalized for natural or economic advantages, including geographic location 
and a larger resource base. Id. at 86. 
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Our examination of the new enforcement structure begins with a 
discussion in Part I of the alleged deficiencies in the pre-August 2013 
enforcement structure.18 Part II(A) discusses the pre-August 2013 
enforcement structure and establishes the predicate for examining the 
new enforcement model.19 Part II(A) also discusses changes to the 
composition of the Committee of Infractions and how it will process 
infractions cases.20 Part II(B) briefly discusses the changes to the 
Infractions Appeals Committee, which remains largely unchanged.21 
Part II(C) addresses a key feature of the new structure: the 
classification of infractions into levels.22 Important aspects of the new 
structure, discussed in Part II(D), include: (1) new penalty 
guidelines;23 (2) holding head coaches accountable for infractions 
committed by assistant coaches;24 and (3) the emphasis on the 
principle of shared governance of intercollegiate programs.25 Part 
II(D) also examines two infractions cases decided under the pre-2013 
structure and assesses how the infractions would likely have been 
categorized and the penalties that would have been imposed if the 
cases had been adjudicated under the new structure.26 Part III 
concludes that the new enforcement structure could effectively 
address some of the shortcomings of the pre-August 2013 
enforcement model.27 
I 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE PRE-AUGUST 2013 ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE 
The new Division I enforcement structure was promulgated against 
a backdrop of harsh criticism of the pre-August 2013 structure.28 
Critics pointed to an infractions case involving the University of 
Miami’s intercollegiate athletics program as emblematic of the 
 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 29–49. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 50–74. 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 79–86. 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 113–25. 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 169–98. 
23 See infra text accompanying notes 225–74. 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 275–83. 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 285–96. 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 297–308. 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 309–10. 
28 Gary Brown, DI Board of Directors Approves Overhauled Enforcement Structure, 
NCAA.COM (Oct. 30, 2012, 16:41 EDT), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-10 
-30/di-board-directors-approves-overhauled-enforcement-structure. 
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problems that undermined the credibility and threatened the 
legitimacy of the NCAA’s enforcement mechanism. In the Miami 
case, the NCAA employed improper tactics while investigating 
allegations that Nevin Shapiro, a University of Miami booster29 and 
convicted felon, provided thousands of dollars in impermissible 
benefits to Miami athletes between 2002 and 2010.30 The 
organization also failed to adhere to its investigative practices by, 
among other things, hiring one of Shapiro’s attorneys, who used her 
subpoena power in Shapiro’s unrelated bankruptcy proceeding to 
obtain information that the NCAA could not access.31 
Although less dramatic than the events that transpired in the Miami 
case, other infractions decisions revealed structural deficiencies in the 
NCAA enforcement process.32 These deficiencies threatened the 
NCAA’s legitimacy and weakened member institutions’ and the 
public’s trust in its ability to effectively handle rules violations. The 
call for a new enforcement structure, particularly as it relates to 
penalties imposed for rules violations, arose from the ground up as a 
survey of the NCAA membership revealed a desire that the 
 
29 Booster is the term commonly used to refer to a representative of the institution’s 
athletic interest. Booster status is acquired by virtue of a person promoting, or being a part 
of an entity that promotes, an institution’s athletics program; making financial 
contributions to an athletic department or booster organization; either assisting, or being 
requested to assist, the athletics department in recruiting prospective student-athletes; and 
providing benefits to enrolled student-athletes or their parents. NCAA MANUAL, supra 
note 8, § 13.02.14(a)–(e). Once acquired, booster status cannot be disavowed and 
continues indefinitely. Id. § 13.02.14.1. 
30 Charles Robinson, Renegade Miami Football Booster Spells Out Illicit Benefits to 
Players, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 16, 2011, 5:37 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com 
/investigations/news?slug=cr-renegade_miami_booster_details_illicit_benefits_081611 
(detailing Shapiro’s alleged provisions of cash, jewelry, paid trips and other benefits to 
athletes); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/178100879 
/NCAA-University-of-Miami-Public-Infractions-Report (providing a detailed discussion 
of the infractions committed by the University of Miami and Shapiro). 
31 Jonathan Mahler, Could the Miami Scandal Bring Down the NCAA?, 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 27, 2013, 6:30 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013  
-02-27/could-the-miami-scandal-bring-down-the-ncaa-.html. The NCAA retained a law 
firm to conduct an investigation of the improprieties in its investigation of the Miami case. 
That report can be found at: CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, REPORT ON THE 
NCAA’S ENGAGEMENT OF A SOURCE’S COUNSEL AND USE OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
PROCESS IN ITS UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INVESTIGATION (2013), http://i.turner.ncaa 
.com/dr/ncaa/ncaa/release/sites/default/files/files/NCAAMiamiEnforcement(1).pdf. 
32 Greg Bishop, In N.C.A.A. v. Oregon, Justice Waits Again, NCAA.COM (Apr. 16, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/sports/ncaafootball/ncaas-case-against-oregon 
-moves-slowly.html?_r=0. 
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organization impose more stringent penalties on violators.33 Indeed, a 
major impetus for reform was the inability of the pre-August 2013 
enforcement structure to sufficiently deter potential rules violators.34 
The old enforcement regulatory structure failed to incentivize 
institutions and institutional personnel, particularly coaches, to 
comply with or encourage compliance with regulations that 
implicated NCAA core values. Critics of the structure argued that the 
NCAA’s reluctance to impose sanctions (e.g., television and post-
season competition bans) that impacted institutional financial interests 
prompted individuals and institutions to engage in a risk-reward 
analysis.35 Involved parties often concluded, pursuant to the risk-
reward analysis, that the benefits derived from violating NCAA 
regulations outweighed the potential penalties that the NCAA would 
likely impose.36 In engaging in a risk-reward analysis, those 
considering violating NCAA rules examined previous cases in which 
athletic programs rebounded quickly notwithstanding the imposition 
of penalties.37 Detractors of the NCAA’s enforcement process also 
argued that inconsistency in results from one infractions case to 
another reduced the deterrent effect of penalties and the entire 
enforcement process.38 Moreover, those critics also claimed that 
inconsistency not only eroded the “moral authority of the NCAA, but 
. . . sap[ped] the rulings of their full deterrent effect because they 
 
33 Gary Brown, Violator Beware: Penalties in New Enforcement Structure Pack a 
Punch, NCAA.ORG (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center 
/news/violator-beware-penalties-new-enforcement-structure-pack-punch. 
34 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. 
35 Id. 
36 Brad Wolverton, Do NCAA Rules Work?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/players/do-ncaa-rules-work/30019; Brown, supra note 33; see 
also Eric Prisbell, NCAA to Widen Powers, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 2012, at 6C; Josephine 
R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation, Enforcement, and Infractions 
Processes: The Laws That Regulate Them and the Nature of Court Review, 12 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 257, 311–12 (2010) (arguing for imposing penalties of major violations 
that impact those aspects of running an intercollegiate athletics program that matter most 
to coaches). 
37 Brown, supra note 33; Steve Megargee, Sanctions Aren’t Deterring Recruits from 
Scandal-Ridden Programs, SI.COM (Mar. 22, 2012, 8:17 AM), http://sportsillustrated 
.cnn.com/2012/football/ncaa/03/21/ncaa.sanctions.recruiting/ (providing examples where 
the imposition of sanctions failed to adversely impact an institution’s recruitment of high-
caliber athletes). 
38 Stephen A. Miller, The NCAA Needs to Let Someone Else Enforce Its Rules, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2012, 4:16 PM ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment 
/archive/2012/10/the-ncaa-needs-to-let-someone-else-enforce-its-rules/264012. 
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seem untethered to any defined principle.”39 For example, critics 
argued that “a comparison of recent challenges to the amateur status 
of several high-profile college basketball players yields few 
discernible rules capable of application in future cases.”40 Concerns 
relating to the lack of effective deterrents and inconsistency of 
infraction decision outcomes hastened the call by some that the 
NCAA delegates its enforcement responsibilities to an external 
organization as a means of enhancing the credibility of the NCAA’s 
enforcement process.41 
The penalties imposed on coaches were perceived to have failed to 
deter violations of core NCAA regulations and to hold coaches 
accountable for violations within their programs. In the past, coaches 
who violated rules escaped the consequences of their infractions by 
retiring or moving to more lucrative programs or professional sports 
organizations.42 The same has been true for student-athletes who 
violate rules but leave their institutions to play professional sports or 
because they exhaust their athletic eligibility.43 
These aspects of the pre-August 2013 enforcement structure 
created another major source of consternation. Critics argued that not 
only did the enforcement structure fail to adequately deter and 
penalize individuals responsible for committing violations, it also 
substantially harmed the innocent, particularly student-athletes.44 
According to these critics, imposing penalties on innocent parties is 
inconsistent with the NCAA’s reason for imposing sanctions—to 
deter violations of its regulations.45 
Other concerns that prompted a call for a new enforcement 
structure include: (1) the lengthy period between the initiation of an 
investigation and the Committee on Infractions’ determination as to 
whether infractions were committed and if so, the penalties to be 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 551, 568–70 (2011) (providing examples of coaches who accepted more lucrative 
employment after leaving athletic programs, of which they were in charge, prior to or after 
the institution had been sanctioned by the NCAA). 
43 Id. at 571–72. 
44 Id. at 574-75 (articulating the criticism, but recognizing that this might be 
unavoidable given the limited regulatory reach of the NCAA to police the behavior of 
individuals no longer associated with NCAA member institutions). 
45 Mary Elizabeth Kane, When the NCAA Strikes, Who is Called Out?, 7 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 141 (2011). 
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imposed;46 (2) the enforcement of rules relating to inconsequential 
matters,47 which strained the NCAA’s limited enforcement resources 
and reduced the organization’s ability to focus on significant 
infractions;48 (3) the two-tiered structure that categorized violations 
as either major or secondary and created arbitrariness in the penalties 
imposed,49 which often failed to reflect the magnitude of the 
infraction committed;50 and (4) a failure of the structure to provide 
institutions and personnel with sufficient guidance as to which types 
of conduct would result in particular types of punishment.51 
II 
THE PRE- AND POST-AUGUST 2013 ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE 
A. NCAA Enforcement Staff and the Committee on Infractions 
1. Pre-August 2013 Enforcement Structure52 
The NCAA enforcement structure is initiated when the 
organization receives information of a possible violation of its 
regulations.53 Apart from institutions, which possess an affirmative 
obligation for assuring that their athletics programs comply with 
NCAA bylaws,54 the enforcement structure consists of three principal 
players—the NCAA enforcement staff,55 the Committee on 
 
46 See ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 4–5 (noting that a goal of the 
Enforcement Working Group was to expedite the handling of cases). 
47 See Eamonn Brennan, New NCAA Rules: Fast, Harsh and Nuanced, ESPN.COM 
(Oct. 30, 2012, 11:35 AM ET), http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post 
/_/id/66180/new-ncaa-rules-fast-harsh-and-nuanced?src=mobile. 
48 Miller, supra note 38. 
49 Brad Wolverton, NCAA Board to Weigh Stiffer Penalties for Programs That Break 
Rules, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 30, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/NCAA-Board   
-to-Weigh-Stiffer/133261/. 
50 Miller, supra note 38 (arguing the NCAA’s conflict of interest discouraged it from 
imposing penalties—such as television bans that would negatively impact the 
organization’s brand and its financial interests—and that penalties for seemingly similar 
violations were disparate). 
51 Brennan, supra note 47. 
52 Note that where the 2013-14 NCAA Division I Manual made no appreciable changes 
to the pre-2013 enforcement structure, references to bylaws will be to the 2013-14 NCAA 
MANUAL. 
53 See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.5.1. 
54 Id. § 19.2.1; see also infra text accompanying notes 247–52 (discussing institutions’ 
compliance responsibilities). 
55 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.5. 
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Infractions (“COI”)56 and the Infractions Appeals Committee 
(“IAC”).57 
The NCAA enforcement staff is the body that represents the 
interests of the NCAA. In so doing, it acts as a prosecutor.58 The 
enforcement staff presents information to support allegations of rules 
infractions to the COI and argues for findings of fact and conclusions 
of law that infractions occurred and the penalties that should be 
imposed.59 Upon receiving reasonably reliable information of a 
potential major infraction, the NCAA enforcement staff, acting on 
behalf of the NCAA’s entire membership, conducts an investigation 
to determine whether to proceed by sending a notice of inquiry to the 
alleged offending institution.60 If the enforcement staff finds evidence 
to support a conclusion that a major violation has been committed, it 
will issue a notice of allegations.61 
The COI, which acts independently of the NCAA enforcement 
staff, conducts hearings, makes factual findings relating to alleged 
violations, and prescribes disciplinary and corrective action.62 Prior to 
the 2013 restructuring, the COI consisted of ten members, eight of 
whom heard and decided cases, and two of whom coordinated appeals 
to the Infractions Appeals Committee.63 
As it relates to the enforcement process, the NCAA enforcement 
staff, as noted above, presents information to the COI alleging that a 
violation has been committed. The institution and/or individuals, 
including coaches and student-athletes, will present information 
attempting to rebut the alleged rules violations.64 The COI determines 
whether violations have been committed and imposes penalties.65 
Note that the COI can only take direct action against an institution 
because it possesses neither police authority nor a direct contractual 
relationship with coaches, student-athletes, representatives of an 
 
56 Id. § 19.3. 
57 Id. § 19.4. 
58 Potuto, supra note 36, at 289. 
59 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, §§ 19.7.1, 19.7.7.4; see Potuto, supra note 36, at 289. 
60 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.5.1; see Potuto, supra note 36, at 288–89. 
61 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, §§ 19.5.3, 19.7.1; see Potuto, supra note 36, at 288–
90 (providing a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the NCAA enforcement staff 
and the activities in which it will engage before issuing a Notice of Allegations). 
62 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.3.6. 
63 Potuto, supra note 36, at 311–13 (providing a detailed discussion of the scope of 
responsibility and composition of the COI). 
64 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.7.2. 
65 Id. § 19.3.6. 
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institution’s athletics interests, administrators, or other involved 
individuals.66 The COI, and thus the NCAA, can take indirect action 
against a coach or institutional staff member by issuing a show-cause 
order.67 
In a show-cause order, the COI directs a member institution to take 
disciplinary or corrective action against an institutional staff member, 
such as a coach, or a representative of the institution’s athletics 
interests.68 For example, a show-cause order may require an 
institution to relieve a coach, who has violated NCAA rules, of his or 
her coaching duties.69 In the event that an institution refuses to 
impose the COI’s mandated discipline or offer a satisfactory 
explanation for refusing to do so, the COI will likely sanction the 
institution.70 An institution that is considering hiring an individual, 
sanctioned by the COI for having committed a rules violation at 
another institution, is likely to receive a show-cause order from the 
COI.71 The threat of receiving such an order deters institutions from 
hiring such individuals.72 It is unlikely that an institution would 
subject itself to the possibility of having the COI impose penalties 
against it for violations an individual committed at another 
institution.73 Recent illustrations of notable college coaches receiving 
show-cause orders include former Ohio State University head football 
coach Jim Tressel,74 former University of Oregon head football coach 
 
66 Potuto, supra note 36, at 298–99. 
67 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.02.3. 
68 Potuto, supra note 36, at 299–300. 
69 One of the more significant sports law cases, NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 
(1988), demonstrates the consequences of an institution’s failure to take corrective action 
against a coach as directed by the NCAA. 
70 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.02.3. 
71 Potuto, supra note 36, at 298. 
72 Zach Osterman, Former Indiana Coach Kelvin Sampson’s NCAA Penalty Ends, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 26, 2013, 8:16 AM EST), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab 
/2013/11/26/kelvin-sampson-former-indiana-hoosiers-coach-ncaa-penalty-ends/3745133/ 
(stating that institutions are reluctant to hire individuals subject to show-cause orders). 
73 See id. 
74 See NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2011) [hereinafter THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
REPORT], available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/downloads/2011/12/NCAAreport 
.pdf. 
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Chip Kelly,75 and former University of Tennessee head men’s 
basketball coach Bruce Pearl.76 
2. Post-August 2013 Enforcement Structure 
In recommending changes to the process by which alleged 
infractions will be processed, the Enforcement Working Group 
acknowledged and attempted to address criticism that the pre-August 
2013 process was inefficient, lacked transparency, and was too 
protracted.77 The recently adjudicated Miami infractions case 
highlighted these inefficiencies, as the NCAA’s investigation dragged 
on for more than two years.78 Britton Banowsky, COI chairman and 
commissioner of Conference USA, indicated that the complexities 
associated with the Miami case were unique and that under the pre-
August 2013 enforcement structure investigations could typically be 
concluded within six to eight weeks.79 Nevertheless, the NCAA 
acknowledged that process-related shortcomings threatened to 
undermine the integrity and fairness of the infraction process.80 
Accordingly, the Enforcement Working Group proposed changes 
seeking to enhance the perceived fairness and transparency of the 
process, create a more efficient processing of violations, and allow 
institutions and individuals more input and control in the way in 
which violations are heard.81 
Under the new enforcement structure, legislation that increases the 
size of the pool of individuals from which COI panels can be drawn 
was adopted to address the forgoing concerns. Increasing the size of 
the pool from ten to twenty-four individuals should allow the chair of 
the COI to empanel more panels capable of processing more 
 
75 See NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2013), available at http://www.goducks.com/pdf9/2348690.pdf. 
76 See NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, 
KNOXVILLE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT (2011), available at http://grfx.cstv.com 
/photos/schools/tenn/genrel/auto_pdf/2011-12/misc_non_event/TennesseePublicInfo 
Report.pdf. 
77 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
78 Michael Casagrande, University Of Miami Starts NCAA Hearings as Nevin Shapiro 
Makes New Allegations, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2013, 2:55 AM EDT), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/13/miami-ncaa-hearings-nevin-shapiro-new-allegations_n_3 
432143.html. 
79 Mason Levinson, Miami Is Spared Bowl Ban by NCAA After Booster Investigation, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2013, 9:25 AM PT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-22 
/miami-is-spared-bowl-ban-by-ncaa-after-booster-investigation.html. 
80 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
81 Id. at 5. 
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infractions cases than under the old structure, and thereby expedite 
the processing of alleged infractions.82 Under the new structure, five-
to-seven-member COI panels will hear cases involving Level I and 
Level II violations.83 This should also enhance expediency. 
Increasing the size of the pool will also decrease the individual 
workloads of members serving on COI panels.84 
The new structure directs the NCAA Board of Directors to appoint, 
to the COI pool, individuals who will lend diverse perspectives in 
assessing alleged violations.85 A new emphasis has been placed on 
including within the pool persons with more intimate knowledge of 
the day-to-day operation of college sports, including former coaches 
and presidents who were categorically prohibited from serving on a 
COI panel under the pre-August 2013 structure.86 In addition, the 
pool will consist of university faculty, current athletic directors, and 
athletic administrators with compliance experience and those who 
may possess more of an academic focus.87 These changes are 
consistent with concerns that the COI membership failed to consist of 
those who appreciate the pertinent rules and regulations as well as the 
complexities of intercollegiate sports on college campuses.88 As was 
true of the old structure, the revised enforcement structure continues 
to emphasize creating a pool of COI members who reflect gender and 
ethnic diversity.89 
As it relates to process, the new structure incorporates changes 
intended to increase efficiency. These include: (1) permitting 
institutions or involved individuals to petition for an accelerated 
hearing of a case involving Level II violations90 and granting the COI 
panel the authority to consider such requests;91 (2) increasing the 
 
82 Michael Marot, New Enforcement Policies Take Effect at NCAA, YAHOO! SPORTS 
(Aug. 1, 2013, 12:14 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/enforcement-policies-effect-ncaa 
-154351946—spt.html. 
83 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.3.3. 
84 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
85 Id. at 10–11; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.3.1. 
86 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 10–11; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 
19.3.1. 
87 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.5.1. 
88 Josephine R. Potuto & Jerry R. Parkinson, If it Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It: An 
Examination of the NCAA Division I Infractions Committee’s Composition and Decision-
Making Process, 89 NEB. L. REV. 437, 453–54 (2011). 
89 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.3.1. 
90 Id. § 19.7.7.2. 
91 Id. § 19.3.7(e). 
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availability of resolution of Level II violations by written 
submissions;92 (3) expanding the summary disposition process for 
Level I and II violations93 so as to allow for the increased resolution 
of disputes by written submissions, appearance by videoconference, 
and other forms of distance communication by institutions and 
involved individuals;94 and (4) under the summary disposition 
process, allowing for the possibility of expedited hearings when there 
is agreement on the facts but disagreement as to the proposed 
penalties.95 
As noted above, the summary disposition process is intended to 
provide an expedited resolution of cases in which there is substantial 
agreement regarding the facts among the involved parties. One 
limitation may, however, curb use of this procedure. Under NCAA 
Bylaw 19.6.1 the enforcement staff, involved individuals, and the 
institution must be in agreement as to all of the factual aspects of the 
case in order to invoke the summary disposition procedures. Even 
where the enforcement staff and the institution are largely in 
agreement as to the facts, disagreement from any individual staff 
member involved could prevent an infractions case from being 
determined under the summary disposition process.96 The obvious 
problem associated with such a standard becomes apparent in cases 
that involve numerous individuals. Therefore, finding unanimity 
across all facts in a particular case, involving numerous individuals, 
could prove difficult. Notwithstanding changes intended to ameliorate 
concerns related to the enforcement process, additional concerns will 
need to be addressed. 
A pre-revision concern of institutions appearing before the COI 
was the COI’s neutrality. Although ostensibly the COI operates as an 
entity separate from and independent of the NCAA’s enforcement 
staff, critics asserted that, in actual practice, the COI functions as an 
arm of NCAA enforcement.97 This concern was allegedly 
demonstrated by the COI’s reluctance to deviate from enforcement 
 
92 Id. § 19.7.7.2. 
93 Id. § 19.6. 
94 Id. § 19.6.4.5. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. § 19.6.1. 
97 See Potuto & Parkinson, supra note 88, at 453 (noting concerns relating to neutrality 
and independence that caused some to call for a reconfiguration of the COI). 
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staff recommendations.98 While such accusations are difficult to 
substantiate, reform efforts, such as those that now allow campus 
personnel and practitioners to serve as COI panelists, may assuage 
these suspicions. 
Although the new enforcement structure adopts a more inclusive 
approach to the COI’s composition, which holds the potential to 
effectively address some concerns, it may also spawn new issues. 
Under the new structure, current and former athletic administrators 
and coaches have the ability to pass judgment on their peers.99 This 
has given rise to worries regarding the inherent biases that some COI 
panelists could possess as a result of institutional or conference 
allegiances. Ideally, the hope is that any COI panel member charged 
with such great responsibility would be above reproach and able to 
maintain his or her objectivity.100 The highly charged and competitive 
landscape of college athletics, however, produces skepticism. This 
skepticism has, in turn, led to a suggestion that in the interest of 
fairness and neutrality, no COI panel member should have an active 
affiliation with a member institution, either as a staff member or a 
representative of its athletics interests.101 A related suggestion is that, 
in lieu of institutional personnel, impartial arbiters (e.g., retired 
judges) should exclusively serve as COI panelists. 
In addition to concerns over the composition of the committee, 
institutions, in the past, took issue with the confrontational manner in 
which infractions hearings were conducted.102 Rather than an 
amicable fact-finding endeavor, COI hearings were adversarial.103 It 
is unclear whether the changes to the processing of cases will help to 
alleviate the adversarial nature of the enforcement process. 
 
98 See id. at 453; Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time 
for a New Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 517 (1995) (asserting the COI is not 
sufficiently independent of the NCAA’s enforcement staff). 
99 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.3.1. 
100 See Potuto & Parkinson, supra note 88, at 458–59 (adopting the position that the 
COI tends to live up to the ideal of neutrality and independence, in part because the NCAA 
enforcement structure facilitates achieving this ideal). 
101 See Brent Schrotenboer, Alabama Case Spotlights Emmert, Saban Friendship, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 15, 2013, 5:05 PM EDT), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013 
/10/08/alabama-illegal-benefits-case-spotlights-ncaa-mark-emmert-nick-saban-friendship 
/2948023/ (commenting on how relationships between institutional and NCAA staff raise 
questions regarding the neutrality of the NCAA’s enforcement efforts). 
102 Potuto, supra note 36, at 316–17. 
103 See id. 
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B. Infractions Appeals Committee 
1. Pre-August 2013 Enforcement Structure104 
The IAC, which consists of five members, is charged with hearing 
and acting on appeals of the findings of significant violations by the 
Committee on Infractions involving member institutions.105 In the 
event of an adverse finding, an institution or involved individual (e.g., 
coach) can appeal an adverse determination and/or the sanctions 
imposed to the IAC.106 
Student-athletes who violate NCAA regulations are rendered 
ineligible for intercollegiate competition.107 An institution can seek to 
restore the eligibility of a student-athlete whom the NCAA has 
determined to be ineligible because of a violation of its regulations.108 
In such cases, an institutional representative, typically a senior 
compliance administrator, would submit a formal request for 
reinstatement on the student’s behalf to the NCAA’s Committee on 
Student-Athlete Reinstatement.109 This committee is the entity within 
the NCAA that determines whether to restore a student-athlete’s 
eligibility.110 A request for reinstatement would typically include a 
position statement from the institution, a personal statement from the 
student-athlete, and documentation of any mitigating circumstances 
(e.g., medical conditions, personal or family hardships, extenuating 
circumstances beyond the student-athletes’ control).111 A student-
athlete does not have the right to file a petition for reinstatement on 
 
104 Note that where the 2013-14 NCAA Division I Manual made no appreciable 
changes to the pre-2013 enforcement structure, references to bylaws will be to the 2013-14 
NCAA Manual rather than to the 2012-13 NCAA Manual. 
105 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.4.1. 
106 Id. § 19.10.2. 
107 Id. § 14.11.1; see also McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 
817–19 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing the process pursuant to which an ineligible 
student-athlete seeks reinstatement). 
108 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 14.11.1. 
109 Id. § 14.11.2. 
110 Id. § 10.4. 
111 See David Pierce, Anastasios Kaburakis & Lawrence Fielding, Compliance 
Officers’ Guide to Navigating NCAA Student-Athlete Reinstatement Cases Involving 
Amateurism Violations, 1 J. ISSUES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 87, 93 (2008) 
(identifying mitigating circumstances); Student-Athlete Reinstatement Frequently Asked 
Questions, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/compliance/reinstatement/student-athlete              
-reinstatement-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (stating that 99 
percent of the nearly 1900 reinstatement requests submitted by institutions results in the 
reinstatement of the athlete). 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  11:39 AM 
2014] Majoring in Infractions: The Evolution of the National Collegiate 995 
Athletic Association’s Enforcement Structure 
his or her own behalf.112 That institution must make the appeal.113 
The institution exercises its discretion in determining whether it is 
prudent to request a waiver of reinstatement.114 In most instances, an 
institution will avail itself of this legislated opportunity.115 However, 
in one recent highly-publicized case, the University of North Carolina 
elected not to request reinstatement for basketball student-athlete P.J. 
Hairston, who had been deemed ineligible as a result of an alleged 
amateurism violation.116 This rare, but not unprecedented course of 
action effectively ended Hairston’s collegiate career. 
2. Post-August 2013 Enforcement Structure 
The minimal changes that the Enforcement Working Group made 
to the appellate component of the enforcement structure were 
intended to improve the efficiency of the IAC’s processing of 
appeals.117 With respect to Level I and II violations, appeals can be 
processed via written submission or videoconference in addition to 
the traditional in-person oral presentations before the IAC.118 To 
speed up the processing of appeals, the new enforcement structure 
establishes time limits. For example, an institution that seeks to 
appeal a finding of an infraction and/or the penalty imposed, must 
submit a notice of appeal within fifteen days from when the COI 
panel released its decision.119 Within thirty days of the IAC’s 
acknowledgement of receipt of a notice of appeal, the appealing party 
must submit initial supporting materials to the IAC.120 As was true of 
the pre-August 2013 appeals process, an active member of the COI 
 
112 See Student-Athlete Reinstatement Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 111; 
NCAA, Preparing a Student-Athlete Reinstatement Request, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa 
.org/compliance/reinstatement/preparing-student-athlete-reinstatement-request (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2014). 
113 See Preparing a Student-Athlete Reinstatement Request, supra note 112; Potuto, 
supra note 36, at 284–85 (discussing the reinstatement process). 
114 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 14.11.1. 
115 See Student-Athlete Reinstatement Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 111 
(stating that approximately ninety-nine percent of the nearly 1900 reinstatement requests 
submitted annually by institutions result in the reinstatement of the athlete). 
116 Matt Norlander, P.J. Hairston Will Not Return to North Carolina, CBSSPORTS.COM 
(Dec. 20, 2013, 1:05 PM ET), http://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/eye-on-college 
-basketball/24382047/pj-hairston-will-not-return-to-north-carolina. 
117 See ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. 
118 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.10.5. 
119 Id. § 19.10.2. 
120 Id. § 19.10.3.1. 
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panel selected to hear a matter will serve as COI’s appeals advocate 
during the appeals process.121 Time limits are also imposed when the 
COI advocate can present appellate materials on behalf of the COI to 
the IAC.122 As it relates to Level III violations, the IAC will not be 
involved in processing these violations.123 Instead, appeals of Level 
III violations will be submitted to a COI panel.124 Unless a request is 
made by the appealing party for an in-person or videoconference 
hearing, appeals of Level III violations and penalties will be 
submitted in writing.125 Appeals of Level IV violations will be 
processed at the conference level.126 
Substantively, a COI determination can be set aside only if the 
appealing party demonstrates that the COI determination constituted 
an abuse of discretion.127 Moreover, a COI panel’s factual findings 
and conclusion that violations occurred cannot be set aside unless the 
appealing party establishes: 
(a) A factual finding is clearly contrary to the evidence presented 
to the panel; 
(b) The facts found by the panel do not constitute a violation of the 
NCAA constitution and bylaws; or 
(c) There was a procedural error and but for the error, the panel 
would not have made the finding or conclusion.128 
The forgoing standard represents a codification of the standards 
applied by the IAC in hearing appeals of infractions cases decided 
under the pre-August 2013 structure.129 
 
121 Id. § 19.10.3.2. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. § 19.11.4. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. § 19.12.2. Each member conference is required to establish processes for 
investigating and resolving rules violations. Id. § 19.12.1. 
127 Id. § 19.10.1.1. 
128 Id. § 19.10.1.2. 
129 See, e.g., NCAA DIV. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM., REPORT NO. 372, 
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, ORLANDO, FLORIDA (2013) [hereinafter CENTRAL 
FLORIDA IAC REPORT], available at http://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf 
/Central%20Florida.pdf; NCAA DIV. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM., REPORT NO. 355, 
BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY, BOISE, IDAHO 21 (2012), available at http://www.ncaa.org 
/sites/default/files/Final%2BPublic%2BReport%2BONLY%2B-%2BBoise%2BState.pdf; 
NCAA DIV. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM., REPORT NO. 289, ALABAMA STATE 
UNIVERSITY, MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 23 (2009), available at http://law.marquette.edu 
/assets/sports-law/pdf/Alabama%20State.pdf. 
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C. Classification of Violations 
1. Pre-August 2013 Classification 
A centerpiece of the pre-August 2013 enforcement mechanism was 
the classification of violations as major or secondary. The NCAA 
Manual defined a secondary violation as one that was “isolated or 
inadvertent in nature, provides or is intended to provide only a 
minimal recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does not 
include any significant impermissible benefit (including, but not 
limited to, an extra benefit, recruiting inducement, preferential 
treatment or financial aid).”130 
Under the forgoing definition, a violation was major and not 
secondary if it could not be characterized as either isolated or 
inadvertent.131 Thus, a violation that may have been isolated but not 
inadvertent constituted a major violation. Similarly, a violation that 
was deemed inadvertent would nevertheless constitute a major 
violation if it resulted in a more than minimal recruiting or 
competitive advantage. In an NCAA infractions case involving 
Stetson University, and one of the few to discuss the pre-August 2013 
classification of violations, the IAC rejected a coach’s argument that a 
violation was secondary if any one of the elements was present.132 
Rejecting this argument, the IAC stated that the elements should be 
read as conjunctive rather than disjunctive.133 According to the IAC, 
NCAA bylaws required that all three of the elements that define a 
violation as secondary must be present for a violation to be 
characterized as secondary and, thus, to avoid it being characterized 
as a major infraction.134 
Secondary violations were subdivided into Level I and Level II. 
Institutions forwarded information regarding Level I secondary 
infractions to the NCAA enforcement staff for processing.135 
 
130 NCAA, 2012-13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 19.02.2.1 [hereinafter 2012-13 
NCAA MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads 
/D113.pdf. 
131 Id. 
132 NCAA DIV. I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMM., FORMER STETSON UNIVERSITY 
HEAD MEN’S BASKETBALL COACH, PUBLIC REPORT 9–10 (Dec. 13, 2002). 
133 Id. at 10. 
134 Id. 
135 NCAA, SELF-REPORTING SECONDARY VIOLATIONS THROUGH REQUESTS/SELF-
REPORTS ON-LINE (RSRO) (2013), available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files 
/RSRO%2BInstructions.pdf. 
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Examples of Level I secondary violations included: (1) a student-
athlete making impermissible telephone calls using an institutional 
calling card;136 (2) impermissible text messaging;137 (3) 
impermissible contact with a prospective student-athlete;138 (4) 
providing impermissible transportation during a prospective student-
athlete’s on-campus visit;139 (5) allowing a student-athlete to travel 
with his or her team and receive travel-related expenses without the 
institution having first certified the athlete’s amateur status;140 and (6) 
not maintaining a squad list for sports teams.141 
Level II secondary violations were processed by athletic 
conferences.142 Examples included: (1) an institution’s failure to 
include a student-athlete on a squad list prior to the athlete 
competing;143 (2) an institution’s failure to adhere to size restrictions 
in regard to printed recruiting materials;144 and (3) an institution 
sending video material to a prospect.145 
The pre-August 2013 enforcement structure defined a major 
violation as consisting of any violation that was not classified as a 
secondary violation because it was not isolated, not inadvertent, or it 
resulted in more than a minimal recruiting or competitive 
advantage.146 Illustrations are numerous of rules violations that fall 
outside the parameters of a secondary violation because the infraction 
 
136 NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, 4 (2009) 
(classifying infraction as a Level 1 secondary violation). 
137 NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, SOUTHWEST BAPTIST UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT 3 (2012) (concluding that a coach sending a single text message to 
a prospect constituted a secondary violation). 
138 NCAA Div. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 
COLUMBIA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 8 (2005) (noting that on two occasions, January 
2000 and November 2001, a booster—then Governor of South Carolina—had brief contact 
with prospects during their on-campus visits). 
139 Id. at 9. 
140 NCAA DIVISION II COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, 
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 8 (2010). 
141 NCAA DIV. II COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC 
UNIVERSITY, POMONA PUBIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 12 (2011), available at http://bronco 
athletics.com/documents/2011/12/16/CalPolyPomonaInfractionsReport.pdf. 
142 John Infante, NCAA’s New Enforcement Model A Mix of Old and Older, ATHNET 
(Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.athleticscholarships.net/2012/08/06/ncaas-new-enforcement    
-model-a-mix-of-old-and-older.htm. 
143 Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference, Reporting Secondary Violations Checklist for 
Institutions, MEAC, at 41, http://www.meacsports.com/fls/20800/Compliance/BPractices 
/SECONDARYVIOLATIONSChecklist.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
144 Id. at 29. 
145 Id. 
146 2012-13 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 130, §§ 19.02.2.1, 19.02.2.2. 
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resulted in a recruiting or other competitive advantage or involved a 
significant impermissible benefit. In 2011, the COI sanctioned the 
University of Connecticut for violations that stemmed, in part, from a 
representative of the institution’s athletics interest providing 
impermissible recruiting inducements to a prospective student-
athlete.147 NCAA Bylaw 13.2.1 prohibits an institutional staff 
member or booster from giving any financial aid or benefit to a 
prospective student-athlete or his or her family or friends, except as 
permitted by NCAA regulations.148 An alumnus, a representative of 
Connecticut’s athletics interests, provided a highly-regarded and 
recruited basketball prospect impermissible recruiting inducements, 
including: payment of the prospect’s standard test registration fee, 
basketball training sessions, and enrollment in a basketball 
academy.149 
One of the more celebrated cases of a major infraction relating to 
impermissible benefits was the case involving Reggie Bush, a star 
running back on the University of Southern California football 
team.150 The COI report stated that sports agents bestowed upon Bush 
and his family gifts including: (1) airline tickets; (2) limousine 
services, which were often requested by Bush or his parents; (3) cash 
that facilitated Bush’s purchase of a car; (4) the purchase of a home 
for use by Bush’s parents (with the understanding that Bush’s parents 
would pay the agents only $1400 of the approximately $4500 monthly 
cost); (5) $10,000 in cash to enable Bush’s family to purchase 
furniture for the house; and (6) substantial cash payments to Bush.151 
The COI concluded that Reggie Bush had violated NCAA rules 
prohibiting college athletes, or their friends or relatives, from 
accepting transportation and other benefits from agents, if the benefits 
 
147 NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT 2 (2011) [hereinafter UCONN INFRACTIONS DECISION], available at 
http://blogs.rep-am.com/time_out/files/2011/02/20110222-UCONN-report.pdf. 
148 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 13.2.1. A benefit is not impermissible if it is 
generally available to prospective nonathlete students or their parents and friends. Id. 
Financial aid and benefits specifically prohibited include cash and expenses for academic 
services. Id. § 13.2.1.1. 
149 UCONN INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 147. 
150 NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT (2010) [hereinafter USC INFRACTIONS DECISION], 
available at http://ht.cdn.turner.com/si/images/2010/06/10/USCreport.pdf. 
151 See generally id. During the same time Reggie Bush and the assistant coach 
committed NCAA rules violations, similar violations were occurring in the men’s 
basketball program relating to star player O.J. Mayo. Id. at 38–45. 
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were not available to the student body in general.152 Bush also 
violated an NCAA rule that prohibits student-athletes from entering 
into representation agreements with agents.153 By engaging in this 
conduct, Bush violated NCAA amateurism bylaws, which generally 
prohibit student-athletes from receiving any level of compensation 
beyond room, board, tuition and educational expenses designated by 
those regulations.154 Bush’s loss of amateur status rendered him 
ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics.155 
With respect to a USC assistant football coach, the COI found that 
the coach knew of Bush’s relationship with the agents and that Bush 
had violated NCAA rules.156 Consequently the assistant coach 
violated NCAA rules by not conveying his knowledge to USC’s 
athletics compliance staff.157 NCAA rules promote self-reporting at 
the earliest opportunities.158 The coach was also found to have 
engaged in unethical conduct for providing false and misleading 
information during the NCAA’s investigation.159 
Applying its rule of restitution,160 the COI vacated all of the USC 
football team’s victories in which Reggie Bush played when he was 
ineligible for intercollegiate athletic competition.161 As a result of 
these infractions, the NCAA vacated the football team’s last two 
victories of the 2004 football season, which included the team’s 
January 2005 Orange Bowl win and all of its wins during the 2005 
season.162 The January 2005 victory was notable because USC was 
designated as the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) winner.163 As a 
 
152 See generally id. at 146. 
153 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 12.1.2(g). 
154 Id. §§ 15.01.6, 15.02.4.1, 15.02.5. 
155 NCAA Division I Bylaw § 12.01.1 states: “Only an amateur student-athlete is 
eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport.” NCAA MANUAL, 
supra note 8, § 12.01.1. 
156 USC INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 150, at 4, 61. 
157 Id. at 61. 
158 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 10.1(d). 
159 USC INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 150, at 4, 61. 
160 Id. at 57; see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.13. 
161 USC INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 150, at 57. 
162 Id. at 57–58; Lynn Zinser, U.S.C. Loses Its 2004 B.C.S. National Championship, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/sports/ncaafootball/usc    
-stripped-of-2004-bcs-national-championship.html?_r=0. 
163 Zinser, supra note 162. The BCS was a computer-generated selection of the top ten 
teams in the NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision. The system created five 
football bowl match-ups, and culminated in the selection of a national champion. The BCS 
Is . . . , BCSFOOTBALL.ORG (Oct. 1, 2013, 4:22 PM ET), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news 
/story?id=4809716. 
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result of the NCAA’s sanctions, the BCS vacated USC’s Orange 
Bowl win, stripping it of the 2004 BCS national championship.164 
Under pre-August 2013 NCAA bylaws, a major violation might 
also have been the product of the cumulative effect of multiple 
secondary violations.165 The impact of the cumulative effect of 
multiple secondary violations is illustrated by the sanctions imposed 
on Kelvin Sampson, former head basketball coach of the University 
of Indiana men’s basketball team.166 Sampson was accused of 
violating NCAA regulations that limit the number of telephone calls 
coaches and other institutional representatives can make to a 
prospective student-athlete—who is a high school athlete that an 
institution is recruiting to play intercollegiate athletics.167 Although 
an isolated, unintentional, impermissible telephone call would have 
been characterized as a secondary violation, the multiple or 
intentional secondary violations gave rise to a major infraction. The 
COI found that Sampson “failed to monitor his program and promote 
an atmosphere of compliance” because Sampson’s coaching staff 
made 577 impermissible telephone calls to seventeen prospective 
basketball players.168 Sampson was found to have intentionally made 
233 of the impermissible telephone calls.169 
In the Indiana infractions case, it was both the multiple calls and 
the intentional nature of the violations that warranted characterizing 
the infraction as major. The COI noted, “[s]uch violations are more 
serious than the same violations committed inadvertently or with lack 
 
164 USC INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 150, at 57–58; Zinser, supra note 162. 
165 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.02.2.1 (“Multiple secondary violations . . . may 
collectively be considered as a major violation.”). See, e.g., SOUTHWEST BAPTIST 
UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 137 (deciding that the sending of a 
single text message was a secondary violation but sending over 400 text messages to 
prospects was a major violation); NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, MISSISSIPPI 
STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 28 (2004) (noting that, although 
improperly reimbursing prospective student-athletes for travel related expense would 
ordinarily have amounted to a secondary violation, the cumulative effective of a number of 
these violations gave rise to a major infraction). 
166 Zach Osterman, Former Indiana Coach Kelvin Sampson’s NCAA Penalty Ends, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 2013, 8:16 AM EST), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports 
/ncaab/2013/11/26/kelvin-sampson-former-indiana-hoosiers-coach-ncaa-penalty-ends/374 
5133/. 
167 NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON 
PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 2 (2008), available at http://www.annarbor.com/Indiana 
.pdf. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
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of knowledge that they are violations.”170 Sampson’s conduct relating 
to the telephone calls was central to the COI’s finding that he had 
engaged in unethical conduct and the imposition of a five-year show 
cause order, which effectively prohibited Sampson from college 
coaching for five years.171 
2. Post-August 2013 Classification 
The post-August 2013 enforcement structure makes significant 
changes to the violation component of the NCAA enforcement 
process. The classification of violations as secondary or minor has 
been jettisoned in favor of classifications identified by Levels I 
through IV. In developing the four-level violation structure, the 
Enforcement Working Group stated: 
The working group anticipates that the proposed structure will 
provide member institutions and involved individuals with better 
notice of infractions, and the level of seriousness assigned the 
infractions, for which they will be held accountable if NCAA 
bylaws are violated. Further, the group anticipates that the proposed 
structure will better ensure that enforcement efforts are focused on 
those infractions that clearly violate NCAA enduring values.172 
The Enforcement Working Group also reasoned that the major and 
secondary violation structure failed to afford the COI the flexibility 
and discretion for the “most serious infractions or intentional 
violations that are currently labeled secondary.”173 It also concluded 
that certain violations that would be categorized as major failed to 
delineate sufficiently between individual and institutional culpability 
for infractions.174 
In recommending changes, the Enforcement Working Group 
determined that the multi-tier infractions structure would lead not 
only to greater flexibility and more appropriate categorization of 
violations, but also would result in increased accountability for those 
who commit the most serious violations.175 According to the Working 
Group, “[f]inally, the four-level violation structure allows the 
enforcement staff to resolve the infractions cases with minimal impact 
 
170 Id. at 7. 
171 Id. at 43; Osterman, supra note 166. 
172 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. 
173 Id. at 7. 
174 Id. at 7–8. 
175 Id. at 9–10. 
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to NCAA enduring values more efficiently and focus its primary 
resources on the most serious infractions cases.”176 
a. Level I Violations—Severe Breach of Conduct 
Based on these articulated reasons, the Enforcement Working 
Group developed a four-level violation structure. Level I, labeled 
“Severe Breach of Conduct,” is intended to encompass the most 
severe rules violations for breaches that seriously undermine the 
integrity of an NCAA enduring value.177 Examples, as stated in the 
bylaws, include violations affording a substantial recruiting or 
competitive advantage or impermissible benefit.178 Other illustrations 
of severe breaches that might constitute a Level I violation include: 
(1) a lack of institutional control; (2) academic fraud; (3) the failure of 
the institution or an involved person to cooperate with the NCAA in a 
violation investigation; (4) individual unethical or dishonest conduct; 
(5) a failure by a head coach to promote compliance in a program and 
to monitor the activities of assistant coaches that result from a Level I 
violation; (6) cash inducements to prospective student-athletes; (7) 
intentional or reckless violations of NCAA rules; and (8) collective 
violations of Level II and III violations.179 
b. Level II Violations—Significant Breach of Conduct 
Level II violations, labeled “Significant Breach of Conduct,” 
encompass infractions that result in more than a minimal but less than 
a substantial recruiting, competitive, or other advantage.180 Conduct 
that could give rise to a Level II violation include: (1) the provision of 
impermissible benefits that are less than minimal but more than 
substantial;181 (2) violations involving conduct that compromises the 
integrity of the collegiate model of intercollegiate athletics;182 (3) an 
institution’s failure to monitor unless such failure is substantial or 
egregious;183 (4) systemic violations that fall short of a lack of 
 
176 Id. at 10. 
177 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.1.1. 
178 Id. § 19.1.1. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. § 19.1.2. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. § 19.1.2(b). 
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institutional control;184 (5) multiple recruiting, eligibility, or financial 
aid violations that do not reflect a lack of institutional control;185 (6) a 
failure by a head coach to promote compliance in a program and to 
monitor the activities of assistant coaches that result from a Level II 
violation;186 and (7) collective Level III violations.187 
c. Level III Violations—Breach of Conduct 
Similar to Level II secondary violations under the pre-August 2013 
enforcement structure, Level III infractions involve violations that are 
isolated or limited and provide only a minimal recruiting, 
competitive, or other advantage and a minimal impermissible 
benefit.188 This has been one of the more controversial areas among 
the enforcement reforms due to the possibility of head coach 
suspensions that may now result from the commission of Level III 
violations. Not only may head coaches be suspended for committing 
Level III violations,189 they are also subject to suspensions for Level 
III violations that are committed by any individual with a direct 
reporting line to the head coach.190 It is controversial, though not 
because the suspension of head coaches is unprecedented. Indeed, the 
suspension of head coaches in response to violations of NCAA rules 
is a longstanding practice.191 However, it is a deviation from past 
practices for head coaches to be suspended for what equates to a 
secondary, or minor violation under the previous enforcement model. 
The intent behind this new approach is to impress upon head coaches 
the urgency of maintaining control over their respective programs. As 
is true of Level I and II violations, head coaches will no longer be 
able to plead ignorance for indiscretions that occur on their watch. 
There will be a presumption of responsibility whether or not they 
were aware. 
 
184 Id. § 19.1.2(c). 
185 Id. § 19.1.2(d). 
186 Id. § 19.1.2(e). 
187 Id. § 19.1.2(f). 
188 Id. § 19.1.3. 
189 Id. § 19.9.8. 
190 Id. § 19.9.8; NCAA, HEAD COACH RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING COMPLIANCE 
WITH AND VIOLATIONS OF NCAA RULES 1-3 (2013), [hereinafter HEAD COACH 
RESPONSIBILITIES], available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/HeadCoach 
Responsibility.pdf. 
191 2012-13 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 130, § 19.5.2(c). 
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Not all Level III violations will result in a head coach’s suspension. 
All infractions will be handled on a case-by-case basis.192 Examples 
of specific Level III infractions that may result in the suspension of a 
head coach, include: (1) the provision of in-person, off-campus 
contacts during a dead period—particularly during the NLI signing 
dead period;193 (2) exceeding the permissible number of contacts with 
a prospective student-athlete;194 (3) intentional or significant game-
day simulations and/or impermissible recruiting aids;195 (4) providing 
team gear or other inducements to prospective student-athletes;196 (5) 
violations that occur as a result of engaging non-scholastic third 
parties in the recruiting process—prescheduled, unofficial visits that 
are impermissibly funded, etc.;197 (6) collective recruiting violations 
and/or other intentional recruiting violations—multiple impermissible 
early phone calls or other contacts;198 (7) impermissible benefits to 
student-athletes by third parties that the coaching staff knows about or 
is involved with;199 and (8) providing a written offer of athletically 
related financial aid to a prospective student-athlete prior to August 1 
of the prospect’s senior year in high school.200 
Level IV Violations—incidental infractions—are akin to Level II 
secondary violations under the pre-August 2013 enforcement 
structure in that they involve infractions of a technical nature and do 
not affect a student-athlete’s eligibility to participate in intercollegiate 
athletics.201 Because Level IV violations are essentially the same as 
Level II secondary infractions under the pre-August 2013 structure, 
they will be adjudicated at the conference level.202 Examples of Level 
IV violations include: (1) failure to sign squad list; (2) failure to 
adhere to size restrictions for written materials; (3) sending general 
correspondence to a PSA via express mail service; and (4) providing 
 
192 Enforcement Process: Penalties, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement 
/enforcement-process-penalties (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
193 HEAD COACH RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 190, at 3. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.1.4. 
202 Under the pre-August 2013 structure, the NCAA outsourced Level II secondary 
violations to the conference offices to avoid the log jam of paperwork at the national 
office. Under the new structure, Level IV violations will be handled in the same fashion. 
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official visit prior to placing a prospective student-athlete onto the 
NCAA Eligibility Center’s Institutional Request List (IRL).203 
D. The Penalty Structure 
1. Pre-August 2013 Penalty Structure 
Under the pre-August 2013 penalty structure, NCAA Bylaw 19.5.2 
articulated a range of penalties that could be imposed for an 
institution’s commission of a major violation.204 Penalties included: 
(1) a public reprimand and censure;205 (2) probation for up to five 
years;206 (3) suspension of an institutional staff member;207 (4) 
reductions in financial aid awards and recruiting visits;208 (5) 
prohibitions on recruiting activities by coaches;209 (6) vacation of 
team wins and individual records;210 (7) financial penalties and 
prohibiting a team’s television appearances;211 and (8) disassociation 
of relations between the institution and representatives of the 
institution’s athletic interests.212 One of the most severe potential 
penalties was prohibiting a team from engaging in competition, 
particularly post-season play.213 Such a ban has serious ramifications, 
including the loss of potential revenue and the opportunity to expose 
an institution and its athletics program. The pre-August 2013 
revisions articulated a list of five aggravating factors that might 
warrant the imposition of a prohibition on post-season play.214 These 
factors included: (1) an individual involved in committing an 
 
203 See, e.g., NCAA, LIST OF INCIDENTAL INFRACTIONS (2013), available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Violation%2BStructure_Level%2BIV_Conference
%2BInfractions.pdf. 
204 2012-13 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 130, § 19.5.2. 
205 Id. § 19.5.2(a). 
206 Id. § 19.5.2(b). 
207 Id. § 19.5.2(c). 
208 Id. § 19.5.2(d), (e). 
209 Id. § 19.5.2(f). 
210 Id. § 19.5.2(h). Under the pre-August 2013 structure, vacation of wins, one of the 
sanctions imposed under the NCAA’s rule of restitution, occurred under the following 
circumstances: an ineligible student-athlete competed, academic fraud, serious intentional 
violations, direct involvement of a coach or other high-ranking institutional administrator, 
a significant number of violations, a lack of institutional control, a failure to monitor, and 
the institution is a repeat violator. Id. 
211 Id. § 19.9.7. 
212 Id. § 19.5.2.4. 
213 Id. § 19.5.2(g). 
214 2012-13 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 130, § 19.5.2(g)(1)–(5). 
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infraction remained employed at the institution; (2) the rules 
violations resulted in a significant competitive advantage; (3) the 
rules violations demonstrated a lack of institutional control, a failure 
to monitor, or a failure to cooperate; (4) the COI found academic 
fraud; and (5) the institution was a repeat violator.215 
It was not necessary that all five factors be present in order for the 
COI to find aggravating circumstances that warranted a ban on post-
season competition.216 In the 2011 Ohio State University infractions 
decision, the presence of two aggravating factors—a failure to 
monitor and repeat violator status—formed the basis for the COI’s 
imposition of a post-season ban on the football team.217 The case 
involved: (1) student-athletes exchanging football gear, apparel, and 
bowl-game rings for cash and tattoos; (2) a coach concealing his 
knowledge of the athletes’ violations from the NCAA and university 
administrators in order to protect the athletes’ athletic eligibility; and 
(3) a representative of Ohio State’s athletics interests, who had gained 
insider status with the football program, paying student-athletes for 
work that they did not perform.218 
An infractions case involving the University of Central Florida 
(“UCF”) illustrates the circumstances identified by the COI as 
providing a basis for imposing a post-season ban.219 The COI found 
violations in the football and men’s basketball programs, including: 
(1) a booster’s impermissible recruitment of several football and 
basketball players under circumstances where institutional staff 
members were aware of his conduct;220 (2) the booster providing 
substantial impermissible benefits to prospective student-athletes;221 
and (3) the athletic director’s and booster’s attempts to obtain 
employment for a recruit’s mother.222 Finding that the forgoing 
conduct amounted to a lack of institutional control and a failure to 
 
215 Id. § 19.5.2(g)(1)–(5). 
216 See THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 74. 
217 Id. at 17, 18; see MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, 
supra note 165, at 28 (concluding that repeat violator status and improper recruiting 
activities of a coaching staff seemingly unconcerned with compliance justified imposition 
of a post-season ban on play by the football team). 
218 THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 74. 
219 See CENTRAL FLORIDA IAC REPORT, supra note 129. 
220 Id. at 2–3. 
221 Id. at 3–4. 
222 Id. at 4–5. 
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monitor,223 and taking into account UCF’s repeat violator status, the 
COI imposed significant penalties.224 These penalties included five 
years of probation, a one-year prohibition on both the football and 
men’s basketball teams’ participation in post-season competition, a 
reduction in scholarships in those sports, a $50,000 fine, and a 
vacation of wins by the men’s basketball team.225 
On appeal, UCF urged the IAC to set aside the prohibition on post-
season play by the football team because the penalty was allegedly 
excessive and an abuse of the COI’s discretion.226 Agreeing with 
UCF, the IAC concluded that the COI failed to distinguish between 
the aggravating factors on which the post-season bans were instituted 
for the football and basketball teams.227 According to the IAC, 
[t]he rationale for the football postseason penalty is so intricately 
woven with factors only supportive of the basketball postseason 
penalty (i.e., continued employment; significant competitive 
advantage) as to make it impossible to determine whether these 
additional factors formed a significant basis for the Committee on 
Infractions imposition of the football postseason [ban] . . . .228 
The IAC further stated that the COI had failed to specifically 
delineate the basis for finding a lack of institutional control as it 
related to the football program.229 Finally, the IAC agreed with the 
COI’s argument that a post-season ban could be premised on a 
finding of one aggravating factor.230 Yet, it concluded that the COI 
must clearly delineate whatever aggravating factor or factors provide 
a basis for the penalty imposed.231 
2. Post-August 2013 Penalty Structure 
a. Level I & Level II Infractions 
In developing a new penalty structure, the Enforcement Group was 
guided by several principles. One was the belief that strong penalties 
should be prescribed for conduct that “clearly violate[s] the NCAA’s 
 
223 Id. at 5. 
224 Id. at 7–9. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 12. 
227 Id. at 13. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 14. 
231 Id. 
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enduring values.”232 The Enforcement Group also developed a new 
penalty structure premised on the belief that the existing structure 
failed to deter serious violations.233 In particular, the working group 
shared the concerns of many external critics of the pre-August 2013 
structure, namely that violators engaged in a risk-reward analysis 
under which individuals and institutions concluded that the 
anticipated benefits and advantages resulting from rules violations 
outweighed the negative consequences of NCAA penalties.234 As 
stated by Ed Ray, the president of Oregon State University and chair 
of the Enforcement Working Group: 
[I]t was clear we needed to have stiffer and more predictable 
penalties, so that people who were doing the “risk-reward” 
calculation would think twice about whether it was in their interests 
to engage in bad behavior. Having penalty guidelines—and having 
penalties that are in those guidelines be more severe than what we 
have now—was a good way of sending clear signals to people.235 
The Enforcement Working Group also acknowledged the widely-held 
perception that the pre-August 2013 penalty structure produced 
inconsistent results.236 The new penalty structure also reflects the 
group’s desire to create a structure that recognizes the efforts of those 
institutions and institutional leaders who operate their programs in 
ways that attempt to ensure fairness of competition, compliance, and 
accountability.237 
The Enforcement Working Group was also cognizant of criticisms 
that the imposition of penalties with the greatest deterrence value, 
such as post-season competition bans and scholarship limitations,238 
adversely impact student-athletes who did not commit violations.239 
While sensitive to this concern, the Enforcement Working Group 
concluded it was outweighed by the interest to protect member 
 
232 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Brown, supra note 28. 
236 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. 
237 Id. at 5. 
238 Brown, supra note 33. 
239 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 16. See Weston, supra note 42 (discussing 
the adverse consequences of NCAA-imposed penalties on student-athletes not involved in 
committing violations); Christopher Davis, Jr. & Dylan Oliver Malagrino, Hold Your Fire: 
The Injustice of NCAA Sanctions on Innocent Student Athletes, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
432 (2012) (discussing the same). 
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institutions by imposing significant violations on offending 
institutions.240 
As a result, postseason bans and scholarship reductions must be 
used in the enforcement process. People (coaches, administrators, 
student-athletes) comprise institutions and sports programs, and 
there is no practical way to impose meaningful penalties on an 
institution without affecting some individuals who may not have 
had any involvement in or benefitted from the violations for which 
the institution is responsible.241 
Cognizant of this concern and in an effort to minimize the 
consequences for student-athletes at institutions that are subject to 
severe sanctions, the NCAA has on occasion waived the transfer 
residence requirement.242 A waiver permits student-athletes to 
compete immediately at another institution.243 
Finally, the Enforcement Working Group articulated the following 
goals of its penalty guidelines in cases involving the most significant 
violations: (1) providing institutions and individuals with notice of the 
range of potential penalties;244 (2) enhancing consistency in applying 
penalties while preserving some discretion of the COI to adjust 
penalties;245 (3) increasing expediency of process without sacrificing 
integrity and fairness of process;246 (4) imposing penalties that 
recognize institutional and leadership responsibility for the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics programs;247 (5) holding 
persons in position of authority accountable for their failures to act 
appropriately;248 (6) imposing penalties on coaches and other 
administrators whose conduct is inconsistent with the NCAA’s 
compliance expectations;249 and (7) imposing penalties that “deter the 
 
240 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 16. 
241 Id. 
242 Adam Rittenberg, NCAA Outlines Policy for PSU Transfers, ESPN.COM (July 24, 
2012, 5:45 PM ET), http://espn.go.com/blog/bigten/post/_/id/53892/ncaa-outlines-policy   
-for-psu-transfers; U. of Kentucky’s LeRon Elllis Will Transfer After Sanctions by NCAA, 
L.A. TIMES (May 22, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-05-22/sports/sp-576_1_leron 
-ellis-kentucky-sophomore-standout. 
243 Rittenberg, supra note 242. 
244 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  11:39 AM 
2014] Majoring in Infractions: The Evolution of the National Collegiate 1011 
Athletic Association’s Enforcement Structure 
risk-reward analysis . . . and address any unfair advantage from the 
violation.”250 
Mindful of these goals, the Enforcement Working Group 
developed a penalty structure the centerpiece of which is standard 
penalty guidelines. Pursuant to these guidelines, core penalties are 
prescribed for the most serious rules violations.251 In adopting core 
penalties, the Enforcement Group was guided by penalties identified 
by the membership as having the greatest deterrent effect and/or 
having the closest relationship to the gravity of violations involved in 
an infractions case.252 
The new penalty structure consists of the following six core 
penalties: (1) limitations of varying duration, depending on the 
severity of the infraction, on an institution’s ability to participate in 
post-season competition; (2) financial penalties including revenues 
that institutions received from participation in events such as 
tournaments or bowl games or the revenue generated by a particular 
sport; (3) limitations on the number of athletic scholarships that can 
be awarded in given sports; (4) limitations on an institution’s 
recruiting activities in a given sport, including prescribing the number 
of official and unofficial visits by recruits at the institution and limits 
on the ability of the institution to engage in off-campus recruiting 
activities; (5) show–cause orders; and (6) placing the institution on 
probation, which requires the institution to comply with conditions 
that are imposed, such as periodic compliance reports during the 
probationary period.253 
The more stringent nature of the new structure is illustrated by the 
guidelines and the minimum penalties that will be imposed. The 
guidelines for Level I breaches would require, absent aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, the COI to impose a one-to-two-year post-
season ban, scholarship reductions up to twenty-five percent of the 
total scholarships allocated to a particular sport, and fines of $5000 
and one to three percent of the total budget of the relevant sports 
program.254 As discussed above, additional penalties (e.g., show-
cause orders and coach suspensions) could also be imposed.255 
 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 5. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 15, 17–18. 
254 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, at 329 fig.19-1. 
255 See infra text accompanying notes 244–45. 
DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/2014  11:39 AM 
1012 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 979 
One aspect of the new structure is similar to criminal law 
sentencing guidelines.256 With the new structure, the COI is only 
permitted to depart from the prescribed Level I and II core penalties 
in cases involving extenuating circumstances.257 In departing from 
the guidelines, the COI must articulate the basis for its departure from 
the prescribed penalties.258 
While prescribing the new penalty structure, the Enforcement 
Working Group did not seek to strip the COI of its discretion. An 
element of subjectivity remains in the process since the COI can 
depart from the prescribed penalties if extraordinary circumstances 
are present.259 Another element of subjectivity remains in the penalty 
part of the process, by granting the COI the discretion to slot cases.260 
The penalty structure includes a framework that allows for the 
prescribed penalties to be adjusted upward or downward depending 
on the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances.261 
The new penalty structure subdivides Level I and II violations into 
standard, aggravating or mitigating.262 A COI panel determines the 
sub-categorization of Level I and II violations after considering the 
presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors.263 
Examples of aggravating factors include: (1) multiple Level I 
violations by a school or individuals committing infractions; (2) a 
history of Level I and II violations or major violations by the 
institution; (3) a lack of institutional control; (4) unethical conduct; 
and (5) multiple Level II violations.264 
The impact of this subdivision of penalties to be imposed for Level 
I and II violations is illustrated as follows. If a Level I infractions case 
is categorized as standard and neither aggravating nor mitigating 
factors are present, the prescribed post-season ban would be one to 
 
256 See Brown, supra note 33 (comparing the penalty guidelines to criminal law 
sentencing guidelines that restrict a judge’s discretion to depart from the prescribed 
penalties absent extraordinary circumstances). 
257 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.9.6. 
258 Id. § 19.9.6. 
259 Brown, supra note 33. 
260 Id. “Slotting” cases refers to the COI’s ability to apply lesser or more serious 
penalties based on the circumstances surrounding the violation. 
261 Id. at 6. 
262 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.9.2. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. § 19.9.3. 
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two years.265 An aggravated Level I infractions case would result in 
an increase in the length of the post-season ban to two to four 
years.266 
In contrast, a Level I case involving mitigating circumstances 
would result in a reduction in the duration of a post-season ban to 
zero to one year.267 Mitigating circumstances include an institution’s: 
(1) “prompt self-detection and self-disclosure of the violation(s);”268 
(2) prompt acknowledgement of violation, assumption of 
responsibility, and undertaking of corrective action;269 (3) exemplary 
cooperation (e.g., identifying information and individuals of which 
and whom the enforcement staff was unaware);270 and (4) 
unintentional violation of regulations.271 
The COI also retains the discretion to supplement core penalties 
with penalties available under the pre-August 2013 structure that have 
been incorporated into the new structure.272 These additional 
penalties include: (1) vacation of contests;273 (2) partial or full season 
prohibitions on a team’s ability to engage in intercollegiate 
competition (commonly known as “the death penalty”);274 (3) 
prohibiting certain coaches from engaging in coaching activities;275 
disassociation of boosters;276 and (4) prohibition on television 
appearances.277 
b. Level III & Level IV Infractions 
Under the new enforcement structure, penalties for Level III and 
IV violations largely mirror those imposed for secondary violations 
under the pre-August 2013 structure. These include terminating the 
recruitment of a prospective student-athlete;278 forfeiture of games in 
 
265 Id. at 329 fig.19-1. 
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268 Id. § 19.9.4(a). 
269 Id. § 19.9.4(b). 
270 Id. § 19.9.4(f). 
271 Id. § 19.9.4(g). 
272 Brown, supra note 33. 
273 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 19.9.7(g). 
274 Id. § 19.9.7(a). 
275 Id. § 19.9.7(k). 
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278 Id. § 19.9.8(a). 
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which an ineligible student-athlete participated;279 public 
reprimand;280 and reduction in scholarships.281 
c. Coach & Administrator Accountability 
The new enforcement structure will result in increased scrutiny of 
coaches.282 Based on the Enforcement Working Group’s belief that 
“head coaches are in the best position to create a culture of integrity 
and accountability,”283 Enforcement Working Group members 
recommended legislation that would hold head coaches responsible, 
through show-cause orders, for the violations committed by the 
coach’s staff.284 A newly enacted provision emphasizes the 
responsibility of the head coach by creating a presumption that the 
head coach is “responsible for the actions of all assistant coaches and 
administrators who report, directly or indirectly, to the head 
coach.”285 The presumption will make it more difficult for a coach to 
escape accountability for the conduct of his or her subordinates by 
claiming that he or she was unaware of their rules violations. 
A head coach can rebut the presumption of responsibility by 
“demonstrably showing what he/she did to both promote an 
atmosphere of compliance and monitor his/her staff . . . .”286 The 
presumption impliedly adopts the notion that the coach will have in 
place processes to monitor the activities of assistant coaches and other 
athletics personnel who report to the coach.287 One example of head 
coaches’ efforts to comply with this new requirement is to invite a 
member of the institution’s compliance staff to all staff recruiting 
meetings.288 Such actions are an affirmative step by which a head 
coach can demonstrate a commitment to compliance. 
A failure by the head coach to adequately fulfill his or her 
compliance responsibilities and the failure of the institution to take 
appropriate action thereafter will subject the head coach to suspension 
 
279 Id. § 19.9.8(b). 
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282 Marot, supra note 82. 
283 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. 
284 Id. at 6. 
285 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 11.1.1.1. 
286 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. 
287 Q&A with Oregon State President Ed Ray, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www 
.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/qa-oregon-state-president-ed-ray [hereinafter 
Ray Q&A]. 
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from coaching activities through a show-cause order.289 A head 
coach’s violation of his or her responsibility will be a Level I or Level 
II violation depending on whether the underlying violation by an 
individual, who reports to the head coach, is a Level I or Level II 
violation.290 
Similarly, the Enforcement Working Group was clear in its 
directives that the responsibility does not end with head coaches. 
Members felt strongly that athletic directors and presidents alike must 
be held accountable for breaches of NCAA regulations that occur on 
their campuses, particularly in cases involving Level I and II 
infractions. This was articulated in the Enforcement Working Group’s 
recommendation that resulted in legislation that gives the COI the 
latitude to identify an institution’s president or chancellor and athletic 
director in the public infractions decision in cases where there was a 
finding of a lack of institutional control.291 This legislation also 
authorizes the COI to identify an athletic director in a case where 
there is a finding of a failure to monitor.292 This action is the most 
significant to date in attempting to hold high-ranking administrators 
accountable for actions in which they were not directly involved, but 
occurred under their watch. 
d. Shared Responsibility 
The new enforcement structure also emphasizes the shared 
responsibility of all representatives of NCAA member institutions for 
upholding the values of the NCAA.293 Each NCAA member 
institution is charged with the responsibility to conduct its 
intercollegiate athletics program in compliance with NCAA’s rules 
and regulations.294 Institutional responsibility subsumes the actions of 
staff members and other individuals and entities conducting activities 
that promote an institution’s intercollegiate athletic interests.295 
Therefore, student-athletes, coaches, other institutional staff, and 
boosters must comply with NCAA rules and regulations.296 
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Moreover, institutions must undertake actions necessary to 
appropriately monitor the conduct of these individuals and entities in 
an effort to ensure compliance.297 Institutions are also charged with 
taking corrective action and informing the NCAA when compliance 
has not been achieved.298 Based on these underlying principles, the 
new enforcement structure imposes an affirmative obligation on such 
representatives to assume responsibility for compliance and to 
cooperate and assist the NCAA enforcement staff, the COI, and IAC 
in “further[ing] the objectives of the Association and its enforcement 
program.”299 
As noted above, institutions have always possessed a duty to 
monitor their programs, educate theirs constituencies, and cooperate 
with the NCAA.300 Therefore, the new enforcement structure has not 
imposed any additional responsibility on institutions. The bar has 
been raised, however, in terms of the extent to which an institution 
must now engage in these efforts in order to meet and properly fulfill 
its compliance responsibilities. For example, an institution’s 
compliance office providing rules education at a weekly coaches’ 
meeting is a necessary compliance activity that likely occurred on 
most campuses prior to August 2013.301 The new enforcement 
structure’s reference to an “affirmative obligation”302 suggests that 
mere rules education will not suffice. Continued educational efforts 
that are supported by systematic, vigilant monitoring efforts are now 
expected. 
This new standard for monitoring and educating staff raises an 
issue that may have been lost in the discussion of increased 
accountability for coaches. These efforts place great responsibilities 
on compliance personnel, who are primarily responsible for 
implementing and enforcing these new accountability standards. This 
can place great strains on compliance departments that are not 
adequately staffed to meet these demands. 
Below are two examples of how the new enforcement model would 
impact recent violations that occurred under the pre-August 2013 
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299 Id. §§ 19.2.1, 19.2.3. 
300 Id. § 6.01.1. 
301 See, e.g., BINGHAMTON UNIV., HEAD COACH RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING 
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enforcement structure. In 2011, a head coach at a Division I 
institution sent a written offer of financial aid to a prospect prior to 
August 1 of the prospect’s senior year in high school.303 The head 
coach thought it was permissible to send the written offer because the 
PSA had listed his high school graduation date as 2010 and his age as 
17.304 This was clearly an inadvertent occurrence that resulted in no 
further action being taken by the NCAA.305 Under the new model, 
this conduct could result in the suspension of the head coach.306 
The University of North Carolina infractions case is another 
example of what would likely have been a drastically different 
outcome under the new enforcement model.307 This case featured 
major infractions including academic fraud, impermissible benefits, 
unethical conduct, a failure to monitor, and numerous 
agent/amateurism violations.308 The COI imposed three years of 
probation,309 vacation of the football team’s wins in which ineligible 
student-athletes participated,310 a reduction of fifteen football 
scholarships over a three-year period,311 a one-year post-season 
ban,312 and a three-year show-cause penalty against the former 
assistant coach.313 Although these were significant penalties, under 
the new structure, instead of a three-year show-cause order, the range 
would have been between five to ten years,314 the head coach (who 
was terminated) would have been subject to a suspension of anywhere 
from fifty to one hundred percent of the ensuing season,315 and 
instead of a three-year probationary period, the institution would have 
incurred a six-to-ten-year probationary period.316 In addition, 
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scholarship limits of twenty-five to fifty percent and a post-season 
ban of two to four years could have been imposed had the same 
violations been adjudicated under the new model.317 These examples 
support the notion that the new enforcement structure may provide 
stronger incentives to comply, which was one of the Enforcement 
Working Group’s principal goals.318 
CONCLUSION 
The NCAA’s enactment of a new enforcement structure represents 
another effort by the organization to respond to the concerns of 
member institutions and to adopt rules that restore trust in the 
organization’s ability to fairly and efficiently govern Division I 
intercollegiate athletics. The new enforcement structure also 
embodies bylaws that promote the three primary goals set by the 
Enforcement Working Group when recommending an enforcement 
structure legislative overhaul: (1) imposing stricter and more 
predictable penalties; (2) having a more transparent and expedited 
infractions process; and (3) enhancing the ideal of shared 
responsibility in promoting the NCAA’s core values.319 Whether the 
new structure will succeed in accomplishing these ambitious goals 
will be determined as the COI begins to process infractions cases 
under the new regulations and precedent develops. It is also likely that 
the new structure will not quiet the NCAA’s most severe critics.320 
Indeed, the new structure, while resolving past issues, is likely to 
spawn new concerns. The effectiveness of the new structure will also 
turn on the manner in which the COI exercises its judgment in 
classifying violations and adhering to the prescribed penalty 
framework.321 Nevertheless, the new structure represents a laudable 
effort, through the adoption of penalty guideless, to impose more 
severe penalties on violators. The imposition of such penalties may 
deter rules violations and stymie the risk-reward analysis previously 
engaged in by those who violate NCAA regulations. 
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